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Abstract
Whether or not meaning is compositional has been a major issue in
linguistics and formal philosophy of language for the last two decades.
Semantic holism is widely and plausibly considered as an objection to the
principle of semantic compositionality therein. It comes as a surprise that
the holistic peculiarities of scientific language have been rarely addressed
in formal accounts so far, given that semantic holism has its roots in
the philosophy of science. For this reason, a model-theoretic approach
to semantic holism in the language of science is presented here. This
approach preserves compositionality to a large extent.
1 Introduction
What makes a semantics compositional? In the standard account, a semantics
is compositional iff the meaning of each complex expression is determined by
the meanings of the component expressions plus the way they are combined into
the complex expression. (Hintikka and Sandu 2001, 49) give the following, more
refined definition:
Definition 1. A semantics is compositional iff the applicability of a semantic
predicate A to a complex expression E is completely determined by the appli-
cability of all and sundry semantic attributes to the component expressions of
E plus the structure of E in terms of these component expressions.
A Tarski-type truth definition is compositional in the sense of definition 1. In
such a definition, the truth-value of a sentence is determined by the values of the
non-logical component expressions and the way these expressions are combined
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with logical expressions. It goes without saying that the model-theoretic defi-
nition of truth, as given in standard accounts of formal logic, is of Tarski-type.
What makes a semantics holistic? The following definition is based on an ex-
planation by Pagin (1997, 13):
Definition 2. A semantics for a language L is holistic iff the semantic values
of expressions in L are determined together, by a totality of relations between
expressions in L.
This definition is intended to imply that, in a holistic semantics, there is wide-
spread interdependence between expressions that do not share any constituent
parts. Therefore, no expression can get its meaning determined irrespective of
other expressions (Pagin 1997, 13).
At first sight, semantic holism flatly contradicts the principle of semantic com-
positionality (Pagin 1997, 11). According to the latter principle, there is a clear
order of determination between the semantic values of a certain set of (simple)
expressions and the semantic values of another set of (complex) expressions.
The principle of semantic holism, by contrast, says that the semantic values of
expressions are determined together such that there are mutual dependencies
between these values. This apparent contradiction serves as a crucial premise
in an argument by Fodor and Lepore (1991), through which they aim to rule
out inferential role semantics on the basis of the principle of semantic com-
positionality, a principle that appears essential to our capacity to understand
newly encountered sentences.1 Pagin (1997) showed, however, that there are
at least two ways to harmonise semantic holism with the principle of semantic
compositionality. We will refer to one of his proposals below.
The major contribution in the present paper is an attempt to analyse and to
resolve the apparent tension between semantic holism and the principle of se-
mantic compositionality for the language of science within a formal account. It
is assumed, for rather intuitive reasons, that this language contains theoretical
terms in the sense that the meaning of such terms is introduced through the
axioms of a scientific theory. The standard way of using model-theoretic seman-
tics for explicating the notion of non-logical truth will be found incompatible
with the thesis of the existence of theoretical terms. Should we therefore dismiss
model-theoretic semantics for the analysis of scientific language outright? This
move will appear unnecessary.
An alternative and yet model-theoretic semantics for theoretical terms and the-
oretical sentences will be expounded here, through which the thesis of semantic
holism in scientific language gains, we contend, clarity and elucidation. One
1According to inferential role semantics, the meaning of an expression α is to
be identified with or supervenes on the inferential relations of sentences having
occurrences of α (see, e. g., Block 1986).
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further result obtained is the confirmation of the compatibility thesis regarding
semantic holism and the principle of semantic compositionality for a wide range
of theoretical sentences. The paper will finally attempt to answer some open
questions with which readers of Quine have been left and, therefore, comes up
with a new proposal of how to draw the distinction between meaning constitu-
tive and non-meaning constitutive sentences.2
The notion of a meaning constitutive sentence is recognisable and of fundamen-
tal importance in such major works in the philosophy of science, as Duhem
(1906/ 1991), Poincare´ (1902/ 1952), and Feyerabend (1962). Duhem’s demon-
stration that a scientific hypothesis in physics cannot be tested in isolation from
its theoretical context is joined with and motivated by semantic considerations,
according to which it is physical theories that are giving meaning to physi-
cal concepts (1906/ 1991, 183). Poincare´ (1902/ 1952, 90) literally claims that
certain scientific propositions acquire meaning only through the adoption of con-
ventions. Clearly, Poincarean conventions are meaning constitutive sentences.
Feyerabend’s critique of the principle of meaning invariance in theory evolution
is derived from a contextual theory of meaning, which says that a scientific term
gets its meaning determined only in the context of a scientific theory.
These rather informal ideas about the semantics of scientific concepts and propo-
sitions seem incompatible with the style of formal semantics that evolved in logic
and linguistics with the work of Tarski. The Tarskian picture leaves no room for
meaning constitutive sentences since it assumes that sub-sentential expressions
are meaningful prior to the semantic valuation of the whole range of sentences.
There is thus, in addition to the tension between semantic holism and compo-
sitionality, another, closely related tension between the presumed existence of
meaning constitutive sentences and the compositional semantics of a Tarski-type
truth definition. The formal account of semantic holism that results from the
present investigation goes hand in hand with an attempt to clarify the notion
of a meaning constitutive sentence within the model-theoretic framework.
2 Confirmation and Semantic Holism
Confirmation holism is a well-known doctrine that needs to be reviewed here
only very briefly. It goes back to Duhem, who observed that a scientific hy-
pothesis has, in general, observational implications only if joined with further
sentences of a scientific theory. As a consequence of this, there are several op-
2Hintikka and Sandu (2001) advanced game-theoretic semantics and IF
(independence-friendly) logics as non-compositional kinds of semantics. IF log-
ics differ from classical logic in the interpretation of the quantifiers. The present
proposal to account for semantic holism does not concern the interpretation of
the quantifiers. Nor is game-theoretic semantics envisioned as a solution.
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tions available for revising the truth-value assignment to sentences if a scientific
hypothesis fails to pass an experimental test. Retracting this hypothesis is only
one choice among others.
Confirmation holism by itself is not a thesis about the semantics of scientific
language. One can very well maintain that the meaning of theoretical sentences
is determined precisely in a non-holistic fashion, even though such sentences
cannot be tested individually. If, however, confirmation holism is joined with
some sort of verificationist account of meaning, then a holistic conception of
meaning with respect to non-observational sentences is implied (Pagin 2006,
214). The original verificationist account of sentence meaning set forth in the
era of logical positivism was not upheld for a long time. Yet, there are ramifica-
tions of it which are considered viable alternatives to standard truth-conditional
semantics by at least some philosophers. Famously, Dummett (1978, 1991) sug-
gested replacing truth-conditions as the basis of sentence meaning by assertibil-
ity conditions along the lines of intuitionistic logic. Putnam’s internal realism,
in which truth-conditions are replaced by the requirement of justification under
ideal epistemic conditions, is inspired by this kind of semantics.
We may indicate briefly the reasons why one may wish to replace the truth-
conditional conception of sentence meaning by some other, allegedly superior
conception. The battery of arguments advanced by Dummett and Putnam may
best be encapsulated in the proposition that truth-conditional semantics leads to
semantic agnosticism in the sense that we would be unable to grasp the proper
meanings of our linguistic expressions if this semantics were to be adopted.
Language learning proceeds, so Dummett argues, on the basis of assertibility
conditions and is not guided by truth-conditions. In short, it is acquisition
considerations concerning the meaning of linguistic expressions that motivate a
deviation from standard truth-conditional semantics. Such considerations may
remain forceful even in the face of counter-arguments to certain elaborations of
the assertibilist account of meaning.
What are the consequences of adopting a broadly verificationist, or assertibilist,
account of sentence meaning for the semantics of scientific hypotheses, given the
holistic limitations of confirming them? As a first approximative answer to this
question, we may set forth the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The semantic value of a scientific hypothesis is determined
only in the context of a corresponding scientific theory or a set of such theories.
This variant of semantic holism will be elaborated here. It differs from total,
or global, holism according to which the whole system of our affirmed, non-
observational sentences is the smallest meaningful unit expressible in scientific
language, a formulation that has been maintained famously by Quine (1961).
Therefore, the kind of holism to be investigated here is of a rather moderate
or relative type. The distinction between relative and global holism as well as
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the distinction between an axiom, or postulate, and a hypothesis of a scientific
theory will be dealt with in Section 8.
One word on Quine’s view of the subject matter. A rather concise formulation of
the semantic consequences he draws from confirmation holism can be found in,
among other writings, Quine (1972). There, he repudiates the view that a single
theoretical sentence can play the role of an individually meaningful knowledge
claim. In his (1969b, 80n, 89) Quine insists on a verificationist account of
sentence meaning. Holism is reported as a doctrine that concerns the semantics
of theoretical sentences in Quine (1981). In like manner, the present paper is
concerned with the semantics of theoretical sentences, but it is intended to be a
bit more formal about the semantic consequences of confirmation holism than
Quine’s and numerous other contributions to meaning holism have been.
3 Asserting Theoretical Sentences
Let us begin with considering the formal notation for asserting a sentence in
Frege’s Begriffsschrift before we move on to the corresponding model-theoretic
notation. Frege, famously, introduced a sign for indicating that a particular
sentence is asserted and another sign for indicating that a sentence has content.
If you put an assertion sign (Behauptungszeichen) in front of a sentence φ, then
you indicate that φ is claimed to be true. Making such a claim presupposes
that φ has a content that can be judged. This is indicated by the content
stroke (Inhaltsstrich). The assertion sign is composed of the judgement stroke
(Urteilsstrich) and the content stroke (Inhaltsstrich). Thus,
(1) φ
was considered to be a proper formulation of the claim that φ is a true indi-
vidually meaningful sentence. Things became more complicated with the rise
of model-theoretic semantics as initiated by Tarski. The question we are con-
cerned with in this section is, what kind of model-theoretic notation is capable
of translating Frege’s assertion sign?
It has been observed that model-theoretic semantics tells us what it is for a
sentence to be true in a (model-theoretic) structure but is of little help when
it comes to understanding the truth of a sentence in the representational sense
of truth. So, arguably, model-theoretic semantics is best viewed as interpreta-
tional semantics in the sense that it tells us what it is for a sentence to be true
only with respect to a particular interpretation of the non-logical symbols of
the language system and the specification of the universe in which the variables
are interpreted. This view has been articulated, among others, by Etchemendy
(1999). Likewise, Carnap pointed out that the model-theoretic apparatus of
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predicate logic is apt to clarify the notions of logical truth and logical conse-
quence but makes no contribution to understanding the notion of factual truth
(Carnap 1973, 98n).
To do justice to our plain and representational understanding of truth within
the framework of model-theoretic semantics, the notion of an intended inter-
pretation has been invoked sensibly (see, e. g., Carnap 1973, 101). An intended
interpretation of a formal system represents the meaning of the non-logical sym-
bols. It can be made explicit by so-called rules of designation which assign either
an intensional or an extensional interpretation to these symbols by means of ex-
pressions of a metalanguage, where every intensional interpretation determines
an extensional one uniquely. Of course, the domain in which the variables are
interpreted must also be specified. With the help of such a notion, the assertion
of a sentence φ can be given the following notation:
(2) Ai |= φ.
where Ai stands for the intended interpretation of the language. If a formal
system has no intended interpretation, then it is not sensible to use sentences
of that system for the purpose of making assertions, apart from logically true
ones.
Whether or not Ai |= φ holds true is precisely determined by the recursive
definition of truth in model-theoretic semantics. According to this definition,
the truth-value of φ is determined by the interpretation of the non-logical sym-
bols occurring in that sentence and, if there are any variables occurring in that
sentence, by the domain in which the variables are interpreted. Which further
sentences or whole theories are held true in the language does not affect the
truth-value assignment to φ. In other words, the semantic value of φ is deter-
mined by the semantic values of its component expressions plus the way these
expressions are combined to form φ. But then, we have to conclude that φ has
a precisely determined meaning quite independent of the theoretical context in
which it is asserted. This conclusion does seem to rule out semantic holism
- regarding the truth predicate of theoretical sentences - in a straightforward
manner. Or, to put it more carefully, the above notation for asserting the truth
of a sentence has no resources to account for holistic interdependencies among
the semantic values of the expressions of a language L.
Model-theoretic semantics gives us a non-holistic account of the meaning of
theoretical sentences, provided the notion of an intended interpretation is used
to explicate the representational dimension of language. This is the simple re-
sult of the preceding considerations, a result that poses a serious problem for
the philosophy of Quine for the following reasons. First, formal logic serves
in Quine’s philosophy as an omnipresent framework, which is supposed to ac-
count for truth and inference not only in mathematics but also in the natural
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sciences. In particular, the model-theoretic definition of truth is used by Quine
in a context wider than that of pure mathematical logic (see, e. g., Quine 1992,
84–86). Second, the notion of an intended interpretation is also used by Quine
himself.3 Third, more importantly, there seems to be no other way to bridge the
gap between interpretational (model-theoretic) semantics and representational
(model-theoretic) semantics than to invoke the notion of an intended interpre-
tation.4
A simple and straightforward solution to the problem just diagnosed would be to
remain content with a purely syntactic understanding of scientific language and
hence refrain from a model-theoretic analysis of that language. This solution
would presumably have been favoured by Neurath but is hardly desirable from
a logician’s point of view. We may therefore seek for a semantic understanding
of scientific language which is not only compatible with semantic holism but
also apt to account for it.
4 Indirect Interpretation of Theoretical Terms
The model-theoretic account of semantic holism, which has been developed else-
where in greater detail, is based on Carnap’s notion of an indirect interpretation
of theoretical terms by postulates. In his (1939, 65-69) Carnap importantly dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of indirect interpretation of a term, one by a
definition and another by a law of nature. Later on in his (1956) and (1975) he
used the term ‘postulate’ to refer to those sentences which are not definitions
but do nevertheless have the function of bestowing meaning on the theoretical
terms. It is of particular relevance to our present concerns that Carnap views
the interpretation of a theoretical term by postulates as being analogous to the
3So he does in Quine (1969a, 53n). In the present paper, semantic holism
is discussed independently of any indeterminacy of translation. Extending the
discussion to include the latter claim is not necessary since semantic holism
needs no support from the indeterminacy thesis. This should be obvious from
the way semantic holism has been introduced above. Furthermore, Quine
(1981) expounds semantic holism independently of the indeterminacy thesis.
In his (1969b, 78–80) he employs semantic holism, as derived from the non-
translatability of theoretical sentences into observational ones, to establish the
indeterminacy of translation but not vice versa.
4The notions of interpretational and representational semantics are borrowed
from Etchemendy (1999). One is doing representational semantics when a de-
terminate understanding of the non-logical symbols is being assumed, however
implicit this understanding may be. This contrasts with interpretational se-
mantics, where no such determinate understanding or interpretation is being
assumed.
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interpretation of a defined term by a definition. We shall now seek to explain
what the analogy consists in.
The notion of an indirect interpretation is to be understood against the back-
ground of a direct interpretation. The interpretation of a non-logical symbol
is direct iff it consists of an assignment of an extension or an intension to that
symbol and is given by one or several expressions of the metalanguage. By
contrast, the interpretation of a non-logical symbol is indirect if it is given by
one or several sentences of the object language which have the status of being
non-logical axioms in the calculus. Carnap’s explanation of the logical status of
postulates mainly concerns their syntactic function: Postulates are, according
to Carnap, non-logical axioms which are taken to be valid in the calculus and
which therefore can be used in every derivation. An intuitive understanding
of postulates is not required in order to justify their use in the calculus. The
theoretical part of the calculus is rather ‘free floating’ and is connected with
the empirical world only by the interpretation of observational terms (see again
Carnap 1939, 67–69).
We will now, in addition to Carnap’s syntactic explanation, move the focus
onto the semantic function of postulates. Some insight regarding this may be
derived from an explanation of the semantic function of a definition. By Beth’s
definability theorem, as given in standard accounts of mathematical logic, we
know that, if a symbol P is defined by a set Φd of sentences in a language L(V ),
there is one and only one L(V ∪ {P}) structure that expands a given L(V )
structure A such that Φd is satisfied. Moreover, we can say that Φd does impose
a constraint on the intended interpretations of the language L(V ∪ {P}). For,
obviously, once a symbol P is defined by a set Φd of sentences in a language
L(V ), an interpretation of L(V ∪ {P}) that does not satisfy Φd cannot be
regarded as an intended interpretation of L(V ∪ {P}). Henceforth, we will
call a structure for a language admissible iff it satisfies the explicit constraints
imposed on the interpretation of that language. In light of this, we can explain
the interpretation of a term by a definition as follows:
Explanation 1. A set Φd of sentences that defines a non-logical symbol P
in a language L(V ) does impose a constraint on the intended interpretations of
L(V ∪{P}). This means, in terms of model-theoretic semantics, every admissible
structure of the language L(V ∪ {P}) must satisfy Φd. With respect to a given
L(V ) structure A, there is one and only one L(V ∪{P}) structure that expands
A such that Φd is satisfied.
How can this explanation be modified to account for the semantic function
of postulates? First, there is no one-to-one correspondence between a symbol
and a set of sentences that interprets that symbol. Rather, one and the same
postulate usually contributes to the interpretation of several theoretical terms.
Second, the introduction of theoretical terms by postulates may be accompanied
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by the introduction of another, theoretical domain of interpretation, in addition
to the domain of interpretation for the observational language L(Vo). In the
case of Carnap’s dual-level conception a domain of (mathematical) theoretical
entities is assumed for the interpretation of the theoretical terms. Third, it
should not be assumed that the interpretation of theoretical terms results in a
unique determination of the extension of these terms. Taking these differences
into account when observing the semantic similarities between definitions and
postulates may result in the following explanation of the semantic function of
postulates:
Explanation 2. A set ΦTC of postulates that interprets a set of theoretical
terms Vt on the basis of a language L(Vo) does impose a constraint on the in-
tended interpretations of the language L(Vo, Vt). This means, in terms of model-
theoretic semantics, every admissible L(Vo, Vt) structure must satisfy ΦTC . The
admissible L(Vo, Vt) structures may have two domains of interpretation, one ob-
servational domain Do and a domain of theoretical entities Dt. With respect to
a given L(Vo) structure A, there may be several L(Vo, Vt) structures that extend
A and satisfy ΦTC .
In Carnap’s dual-level conception of scientific language, on which we are aiming
to elaborate, the interpretation of the observational language L(Vo) is assumed
to be determined uniquely by rules of designation reflecting the intended in-
terpretation of L(Vo). There is thus a twofold constraint on the admissible
interpretations of L(Vo, Vt), one by the interpretation of L(Vo) and another by
the postulates ΦTC . In other words, an L(Vo, Vt) structure is admissible iff
it satisfies the postulates and extends the intended interpretation of L(Vo) to
include an interpretation of the theoretical terms Vt.
Based on such an understanding of an admissible structure, truth rules for
theoretical sentences may be set up as follows. The symbol ΦTC stands for a
set of T- and C-postulates, where the T-postulates contain only Vt terms as
non-logical symbols, while the C-postulates contain both Vo and Vt terms. Let
Ao be designating the intended interpretation of the observational language.
Let MOD(ΦTC) be designating the set of L(Vo, Vt) structures that satisfy the
postulates ΦTC and EXT(Ao, Vt, Dt) the L(Vo, Vt) structures that extend Ao
to include an interpretation of the Vt symbols, where these symbols are allowed
to have argument positions that are interpreted in Dt. Every extension of a
given L(Vo) structure A, by definition, must agree with this structure on the
interpretation of the Vo symbols. A theoretical sentence is one in which at
least one theoretical term occurs. Then, the truth-value assignment to such a
sentence is defined as follows:
Definition 3. Sa designates the set of L(Vo, Vt) structures that are admissible
under an interpretation of the Vt symbols by the postulates ΦTC . It is defined
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as follows:
Sa :=
{
MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) if MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) 6= ∅,
EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) if MOD(ΦTC) ∩ EXT (Ao, Vt, Dt) = ∅.
Definition 4. ν(φ) is the function that assigns truth-values to theoretical sen-
tences of L(Vo, Vt). It is defined as follows:
i) ν(φ) := T iff for every structure A ∈ Sa, A |= φ holds
ii) ν(φ) := F iff for every structure A ∈ Sa, A |= φ does not hold
iii) ν(φ) is indeterminate iff there is at least one structure A1 for which A1 |= φ
holds true and at least another structure A2 for which A2 |= φ does not hold
true, where both A1 and A2 are members of Sa, the set of admissible structures.
The idea lying behind these rules is rather simple: A theoretical sentence is
true iff it is true in every admissible structure. A theoretical sentence is false
iff it is false in every admissible structure. And a sentence has no determinate
truth-value iff it is true in, at least, one admissible structure and false in, at
least, another structure being also admissible.
The third clause of the definition indicates that truth-value gaps may occur
at the theoretical level of the language because the interpretation by postu-
lates does not result in a unique interpretation of theoretical terms. The most
convenient way to deal with such indeterminate sentences appears to be the
super-valuation logic originally developed by van Fraassen (1969). Taking re-
course to this logic is convenient and beneficial because the logical axioms and
inference rules of classical logic remain valid there.5
5For a closer examination of how truth-value gaps at the theoretical level are
dealt with, see Andreas (2008). One may wonder whether a paraconsistent logic
would also be a means to deal with indeterminate sentences. Paraconsistent
logics, however, are advanced in view of situations in which a proposition and
its negation can be derived, shown to be true, or are simply maintained. No such
situation necessarily arises in the case of the present system as long as the set of
postulates is consistent with the set of true observation sentences. Introducing
a logic that allows to reason with inconsistencies would be a further step that
is not required by the occurrence of truth-value gaps.
The three-valued logics of  Lukasiewicz and Kleene, which are adjusted to
the occurrence of truth-value gaps, come with a deviation from the inferential
systems of classical logic. Hence, if preservation of logical axioms and inference
rules of classical logic is considered a desideratum, supervaluation logic, or a
corresponding modal version of that logic, is the first choice to account for
truth-value gaps.
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5 Semantic Holism in the Framework of Model
Theory
How may the preceding elucidation of Carnap’s doctrine of indirect interpre-
tation of theoretical terms contribute to a model-theoretic account of semantic
holism? Now, the truth-rules in definition 4 give rise to another model-theoretic
translation of (1), the formal notation for asserting a sentence in Frege’s Be-
griffsschrift. For the assertion of a theoretical sentence φ, we propose to adopt
the following notation:
(3) Sa |= φ
In words: For all structures A ∈ Sa it holds that A |= φ, where Sa, the set
of admissible structures, is defined by definition 3. This notation can be seen
to differ in two major respects from what has been assumed to be the model-
theoretic standard notation. First, in place of a single intended interpretation
there is now a range of interpretations which equally qualify as being intended
ones. Second, sentences of the object language are allowed to determine which
interpretations of the language are the intended ones.
In what sense is the present semantics of theoretical terms and sentences a
holistic one? Now, unlike standard semantics, where the valuation of theoreti-
cal terms is taken as being determined directly in an intended interpretation, the
values of such terms are determined indirectly through the axioms of a scientific
theory. Notably, these axioms establish conceptual relations among the theo-
retical symbols such that certain systems of valuations are admissible - those in
which the axioms are true - and others - those which do not satisfy any axiom
- not admissible. Because these conceptual relations are part of the definiens in
the definition of the set of admissible structures, it holds that the theoretical
symbols get their semantic values determined not independently of one another.
Hence, we have a case of (moderate) holism in the sense of definition 2.
Think of the ideal gas law as a simple example of a conceptual relation between
theoretical terms. Any valuation of the symbols for pressure, volume and tem-
perature not satisfying this law is not admissible for empirical systems being
an intended application of the ideal gas law. The value of the pressure func-
tion is thus not determined independently of the values of the temperature and
the volume function, where amounts of gas serve as the empirical arguments of
these functions. The values of these function may in turn depend on the values
of further theoretical and non-theoretical symbols, depending on the choice of
measurement. Hence, we have widespread interdependence between the seman-
tic values of expressions that do not share any constituent parts, as was required
by definition 2.
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What about compositionality? The surprising result is that compositionality -
in the sense of definition 1 - still holds for theoretical sentences. For the semantic
value of a theoretical sentence is determined through the semantic values of its
component expressions, with the qualification that any admissible valuation of
the component expressions needs to be considered. Hence, we can say that
the admissible systems of valuation of the component expressions determine
the semantic value of a theoretical sentence. The determination of logically
complex expressions through the semantic values of simple expressions is less
straightforward than in standard semantics, but compositionality still holds.
Hence, we seem to have established another case where semantic composition-
ality and semantic holism are compatible. This case is of the type envisioned by
Pagin (1997), viz., holistic interdependence between the semantic values of sim-
ple expressions and compositionality for logically complex expressions. Pagin
exemplified this type of compatibility with inferential role semantics through
assuming the existence of abstract functions mapping inferential roles of an ex-
pression to its meaning, where meanings are taken as primitive and are not
further analysed. Here, the ‘mechanism’ of holistic interdependence is analysed
and accounted for in a more concrete fashion, as the definitions 3 and 4 show how
theoretical terms and theoretical sentences get their semantic values assigned
to. Adopting Church’s (1956, 6) explanation of what the meaning, or sense, of
an expression is, viz., that what determines the extension of that expression, we
can say that these definitions represent the meaning of theoretical terms and
theoretical sentences. In both Pagin’s and the present analysis our intuition that
compositionality is essential to the semantics of logical symbols can be retained
and even remains justified despite widespread holistic interdependencies.
Arguably, there are exceptions to the principle of compositionality. The seman-
tics of postulates cannot be claimed to be compositional in any legitimate sense.
For the theoretical symbols are nothing but meaningless uninterpreted symbols
prior to the adoption of a set of sentences as postulates. It would therefore be
wrong to say that the semantic values of postulates depend on the semantic val-
ues of their component expressions. Rather, the order of determination between
component expressions and sentences is reversed in the case of postulates. It
is the semantic values of the postulates that determine - besides the valuation
of the non-theoretical symbols - the valuation of the (theoretical) component
expressions.6
6Schurz (2005) has already shown that the semantics of scientific theories is
non-compositional. His investigation is concerned with Lewis’s (1970) account
of theoretical terms. There, Lewis attempted a definition of theoretical terms
which rests on the possibility of a unique determination of the extension of such
terms. The present semantics of theoretical sentences remains, however, more
faithful to Carnap’s doctrine of partial interpretation, which does not allow for
a unique determination.
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It can be observed finally that the truth-value assignment to theoretical sen-
tences is defined here such that proposition 1 holds for theoretical sentences
not being considered as postulates. Since the range of admissible structures
is determined partly through the set ΦTC of postulates, the truth-value of a
theoretical sentence depends on the context of a scientific theory.
6 A Simple Case Study
Let us demonstrate the difference between standard model-theoretic semantics
and its present modification with a simple case study concerning the semantics of
the time function in physics. Poincare´ argued that propositions about temporal
distances acquire meaning only through a semantic convention that defines the
concept of equality of temporal distances. The argument, in short, is that there
is no direct means of comparing succeeding temporal intervals, and any indirect
method of comparison rests on some previously adopted standard of congruence.
For a long time, the periods of a mechanical pendulum served as such a standard.
More precisely, the statement that succeeding periods of the oscillating motion
of a mechanical pendulum are of equal duration was used. Let us introduce
some symbolic notation to analyse the logical structure of such a statement.
Vd, the non-logical vocabulary, may be equated with the set {t, S,E}. These
constants are intended to have the following meanings:
t(x) - time function
S(x, y) - event x succeeds event y
E(x) - x is an event where the pendulum reaches an extremum on
either side.
Vo = {E,S}, Vt = {t}. Do is a set of observational, spatiotemporal events, Dt
the set of real numbers. Now, a formalisation of the convention that succeeding
periods of a mechanical pendulum are of equal duration may go as follows:
(4)
∀x∀y∀z(S(y, x) ∧ S(z, y) ∧ E(x) ∧ E(y) ∧ E(z)∧
¬∃u(S(u, x) ∧ S(z, u) ∧ E(u) ∧ ¬(u = y))→ t(y)− t(x) = t(z)− t(y))
It is important to note here - and this point is the key motivation of the present
investigation - that the semantic value of this statement determines, in part,
the semantic values of the time function. If we attempted to use the recursive
model-theoretic definition of truth to determine the semantic value of state-
ment (4), this would not get us very far because the semantic values of the time
function are completely indeterminate prior to the introduction of a standard
of congruence for the measurement of time. Hence, in the case of the above
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statement, which has the function of a semantic convention, compositionality
fails to hold. Equivalent considerations apply to the semantics of other physi-
cal magnitudes, as temperature in phenomenological thermodynamics, force in
classical mechanics, or electromagnetic field intensity in electrodynamics.
7 A Criterion for a Sentence’s Being a Postulate
So far, the semantic function of postulates has been elucidated, but little has
been said about how to draw the distinction between postulates and other the-
oretical sentences. For this we propose to adopt the following explanations:
Explanation 3. A theoretical sentence φ is a postulate iff i) it is held true, ii)
neither acquired nor justified by inferential transformations of a set of sentences
whose members are also held true, and iii) it is not logically true.
The notion of a theoretical sentence can be explained simply as follows:
Explanation 4. A sentence φ is called theoretical iff there is at least one
theoretical term occurring in φ.
Still, we need to explain the distinction between observational and theoretical
terms:
Explanation 5. A symbol α is called observational iff the determination of its
extension, or at least a part of its extension, can proceed in a direct manner.
That means, there is a method of determining α not dependent on the validity
of any inferential transformation.
Explanation 6. A symbol α is called theoretical iff every method of determin-
ing its extension rests on inferences. The validity of these inferences is dependent
on general axioms which are neither true for logical reasons nor true by virtue
of being a definition.
These explanations essentially refer to the practice of scientific reasoning and
to the affirmations made by speakers of the scientific community. Clause i) of
explanation 3 may be qualified such that a postulate is held true by adherents
of a research programme in the sense of Lakatos. Therefore, in scientific con-
texts, several systems of postulates might be necessary to accomplish a logical
reconstruction. This would amount to there being several, partially overlapping
linguistic frameworks in use within one and the same scientific community.
Paradigmatic examples of postulates, as the axioms of a certain axiomatisation
of classical mechanics or the postulates of an axiomatisation of quantum me-
chanics qualify clearly as such according to the above explanations. Such axioms
are neither definitions nor logical truths nor derived from other propositions. By
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contrast, paradigmatic examples of scientific hypotheses - as opposed to the ax-
ioms - of a scientific theory, such as sentences reporting the values of a scientific
quantity for particular empirical objects, are not classified as postulates. As-
sertions of such sentences are rather based on derivations from postulates and
observational antecedent conditions. Certain sentences determining the metric
of scientific concepts can be singled out as postulates, furthermore. Think, for
example, of the proposition that water freezes at zero degrees Celsius under
standard pressure.7
8 Relative and Methodological Holism
Quine (1981) distinguishes between two kinds of holism. What he calls moder-
ate or relative holism already acknowledges that we cannot expect a scientific
sentence to have its own separable meaning. But relative holism retains a dis-
tinction in kind between sentences that determine the structure and the mean-
ing of the language and other sentences not having this function. Quine thinks
that relative holism should be superseded by methodological holism, which is
introduced in his (1981, 71n) as follows:
The fourth move, to methodological holism, follows closely on this
holism [i. e., relative holism, author]. Holism blurs the supposed
contrast between the synthetic sentence, with its empirical content,
and the analytic sentence, with its null content. The organizing role
that was supposedly the role of analytic sentences is now seen as
shared by sentences generally, and the empirical content that was
supposedly peculiar to synthetic sentences is now seen as diffused
through the system.
To whom shall we attribute relative holism? This question is difficult to an-
swer. Carnap distinguishes sentences interpreting theoretical terms from other
sentences in (1939, 1956, 1975), but in none of these writings are sentences of the
former type considered analytic outright. Likewise, Poincare´’s conventionalism
seems to be a holism of the relative type, with the qualification that conventions
are not assumed to be void of empirical content.
Independently of historical considerations, we can say that it is rather mislead-
ing to construe relative holism as relying on the analytic-synthetic distinction.
This becomes evident in light of the present account of semantic holism. In this
account, only sentences qualifying as postulates are assumed to determine the
7The notion of a theory is taken as primitive here and left without a formal
explanation. Inspiration of how to make the individuation of theories as well as
their interrelations precise may be gained from Balzer et al. (1987).
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meaning of theoretical terms. And the distinction between postulates and other
theoretical sentences must clearly not be equated with the analytic-synthetic
distinction. Analyticity is therefore no requirement for a sentence to determine
the meaning of non-logical symbols. Henceforth, we shall be using the term ‘rel-
ative holism’ in the wider sense such that this kind of holism is not understood
as relying on the analytic-synthetic distinction.
It appears now as unnecessary to move from relative to methodological holism,
for the present account of semantic holism expounds a holism of the relative type
that does not rely on the analytic-synthetic distinction. It is furthermore doubt-
ful whether methodological holism can be combined with a model-theoretic ac-
count of the meaning of the logical symbols in scientific language. If what
has been said is correct and notation (3) is adopted for the assertion of theo-
retical sentences, then semantic holism gets integrated into a model-theoretic
account of sentence meaning. But this notation essentially relies on the dis-
tinction between sentences interpreting theoretical terms and others not having
this function. Therefore, notation (3) cannot be adjusted to the view that “the
organising role is shared by sentences generally”.
The difficulties inherent in Quine’s supposedly model-theoretic account of scien-
tific language have been observed already by Dummett (1978, 303–318). There,
he claims that, under a holistic conception of scientific language, a model-
theoretic account of sentence meaning ceases to have any explanatory value,
where holism is understood as methodological holism. More precisely, Dum-
mett’s claim is that a proof of soundness of an axiomatisation of classical logic
can only be seen as justifying inferential practice in science if a non-holistic
conception of sentence meaning is assumed.
Particularly relevant to our discussion of semantic holism is that Dummett
(1978, 303), charitably, interprets Quine as having a preference for a syntac-
tic rather than a semantic approach to logic. Even though the attribution of
such a preference to Quine can, to our mind, hardly be justified as an interpre-
tation of his work, the reason why Dummett makes this attribution seems to
be a proper one: Methodological holism disconnects model theory from scien-
tific language so that a purely syntactic understanding of that language should
be preferred consequently. To this we add that the connection between model
theory and scientific language can be re-established if we remain adherent of
relative holism.
9 Note on Incommensurability
Feyerabend (1962) expounds the view that meaning variance of a scientific con-
cept in theory evolution results in different, mutually incommensurable con-
cepts. In a reexamination of his own work, he explained that the notion of
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incommensurability was intended to mean a deductive separation of theories in
the sense that it is inadmissible to use one and the same calculus, or one and
the same formal language, to express statements of different theories with in-
commensurable concepts (Feyerabend 1978, 179n). No claim is made there that
incommensurability leads to serious problems of communication, a view that
was contemplated upon by Kuhn for conflicting paradigms. It appears that the
present semantics of theoretical terms supports the view that meaning variance
of scientific concepts in theory evolution gives rise to deductive separation with-
out having the consequence that one is bound to speak and to understand only
one language. To show this, let us continue the simple case study concerning
measurement of time from Section 6.
It is a presumed insight of Poincare´ that propositions about the duration of time
acquire meaning only through the - implicit or explicit - introduction of a time
metric that defines the equality, or congruence, of temporal distances between
spatiotemporal events. Is there a unique meaning to the notion of congruence
of temporal intervals? Several standards of congruence have been used in the
history of physics. Huygens gave a precise description of a pendulum clock and
a corresponding definition of the unit of one second. Therein, he assumed that
one and the same pendulum clock with a constant and well defined length could
be used at different latitudes, an assumption that was soon found not to agree
with the presumed constancy of the rotation of the earth (Mach 1933, 149–
155). As a consequence of this divergence, the statement that the earth rotates
with constant velocity had been adopted as standard of temporal congruence.
Finally, in the 20-th century, the unit of time has been defined in terms of the
radiation of Caesium 133, as is well known. On the basis of this definition and
corresponding clocks with a very high level of precision, slight variations in the
angular velocity of the earth could be measured.
Using the words of Feyerabend, one can say that the history of measuring time
in physics exhibits a certain degree of meaning variance with respect to the
time metric in use. Moreover, Feyerabend seems correct when he points out
that meaning variance leads to deductive separation of statements being con-
nected to different theories or frameworks. One cannot use the same symbols for
expressing propositions about temporal distances when different time metrics
underlie these propositions. The deductive separation of such propositions has,
however, not the consequence that one is bound to understand only one time
metric. Historians of science as well as many scientists have rather acquired a
multilingual language competency which allows them to move between different
conceptual frameworks. With the help of some technical transformations, it is
not difficult to construct an all encompassing language that contains different
conceptual frameworks as sub-languages.
The formal semantics of Poincarean conventions being elaborated here is apt,
we think, to analyse more severe cases of incommensurability which had been
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a central issue in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science. The statement that the
earth is at rest serves as semantic convention in the astronomy of Ptolemaeus,
which is used to determine the semantic values of statements about the spa-
tiotemporal positions of other heavenly bodies in our solar system. By contrast,
the statement that the sun is at rest serves as an alternative semantic convention
in Copernican astronomy. From the viewpoint of the present semantics, it is
not sensible to ask which system of conventions represents the physical facts as
they truly are. Rather, pragmatic criteria, as simplicity of theory formulation,
empirical scope, and explanatory power, will be decisive for the adoption of
one framework or another in case more than one framework proves empirically
adequate. This view has been advocated by numerous authors before but most
of the time without a proper semantics.
Note that the adoption of a system of conventions is not void of empirical, factual
content since, in case the interpretation of the observational language cannot
be extended to an L(Vo, Vt) structure satisfying the postulates, the sentences
being postulates are not assigned to the value true according to the definitions
(3) and (4). The empirical content of a system of postulates, or conventions, is
thus construed in a holistic fashion, which is in line with the ideas Poincare´ and
Carnap had about conventions and postulates respectively.
The view that a scientific language contains meaning constitutive sentences - in
the sense that scientific terms are meaningless symbols prior to the affirmation
of such sentences - has been taken here as the essence of Poincarean convention-
alism. We did not argue for that view in detail but tried to render it plausible
through giving it a semantic foundation using model-theoretic notions. The
opponent of Poincarean conventions and Carnapian postulates has the burden
to show how scientific statements get their semantic values assigned to and to
show, moreover, how scientists come into a position to recognise an assignment
as being correct if no method of determination may be introduced through con-
ventions or postulates. These notions are taken synonymously here.8
10 Conclusion
Is meaning compositional in scientific language? The presumed existence of
meaning constitutive sentences gives rise to the thesis of semantic holism and
does therefore suggest a negative answer. On the other hand it must be noted
that compositionality inheres in the standard truth definition in model-theoretic
semantics. From a logician’s point of view, this may appear to be an even
stronger argument for compositionality than the foundational role that com-
8For a more recent exposition of conventionalism concerning spatiotempo-
ral metrics, with particular consideration of the theory of special and general
relativity, see Gruenbaum (1973).
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positionality is supposed to play in our mastering a language. The present
investigation attempted to resolve the tension between semantic holism and
compositionality within the model-theoretic framework.
The core idea of the resolution is to let the meaning constitutive sentences
determine the admissible interpretations of a scientific language with theoret-
ical symbols. Then, the notion of truth of a theoretical sentence is defined as
truth in all admissible interpretations. The semantic values of sub-sentential
expressions thus continue to determine the semantic values of sentences, with
the qualification that the order of determination is reversed for meaning consti-
tutive sentences. Arguably, these sentences are exempted from the principle of
compositionality. The range of exceptions is, however, very small in comparison
to the large range of non-meaning constitutive sentences for which composi-
tionality holds outright. At least, this is an empirical hypothesis concerning
scientific languages which may be confirmed through applying the criteria that
have been set up for a sentence’s being meaning constitutive.
How does a scientific language differ from ordinary language? From the view-
point of the present investigation, we are tempted to say that the existence
of meaning constitutive sentences is what is distinct of a scientific language.
Yet, ordinary language may be argued to contain such sentences as well. If
one wishes to maintain some variant of the descriptive picture in the theory
of proper names, one is well advised to view the proposition that Moses led
the Israelites out of Egypt as constituting, in part, the meaning of the proper
name “Moses”. Furthermore, conceptual relations among predicates may also
be recognisable in ordinary language. As the proposition that water is not
combustible may be used to identify amounts of water, this proposition has
a meaning constitutive function. To maintain the above characterisation of a
scientific language, we propose to follow the view that scientific theorising is
present in ordinary language already. Further research must show whether the
results of the investigation have further non-intended applications in the for-
mal semantics of languages being not explicitly scientific but resemble scientific
languages in containing meaning constitutive sentences.
Acknowledgement: I am grateful to an unkonwn reviewers for very helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft.
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